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Abstract
The behavior of different types of investors plays an important role in determining asset price fluctuations.
We analyze financial interactions between fundamentalists and chartists within a heterogeneous agent
model. In particular, we ask whether the presence of fundamentalists is enough to stabilize prices.
In contrast to related work, which is based on simulations, we analytically prove that the presence of
fundamentalists is not sufficient to avoid asset price bubbles. The behavior of trend followers might lead
to exploding price processes irrespective of fundamentalists’ investment decisions. Upper boundaries for
positive feedback traders’ investments are derived which are necessary to avoid exploding prices. In this
situation, intervention measures might be necessary in order to stabilize stock/asset markets.
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1 Motivation
Bubbles in financial markets have over and over again caused major macroeconomic problems, e.g., very
prominently in the subprime havoc of 2007/8 [Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009]. While misguided macroeco-
nomic policies have been chief among the usual suspects in the search for the causes of such aberrations,
an important strand of the literature is focusing on the question whether the specific behavior of market
participants is responsible for price bubbles. In particular, heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) analyze
how both chartists and fundamentalists are able to determine asset price movements [Hommes, 2006a].
Chartists, e.g., trend followers, only trade based on information of the price process, i.e., they assume
that all important information is present in the asset price [Graham et al., 1934]. In contrast, fundamen-
talists have some fundamental value in mind and trade according to the perceived over- or undervaluation
of the underlying asset. Trend followers magnify the current trend, either positively or negatively, as they
trade according to the rule: the greater the absolute value of the slope of the price process, the greater the
investment or disinvestment [Covel, 2004]. Fundamentalists, in contrast, invest or disinvest if the price
is below or above the fundamental value, thereby pushing the asset price towards its fundamental value.
Traders act self-interested1, with the intention of making profit, and do not ponder the consequences on
prices. As a consequence of the two different investment strategies, the presence of chartists can cause
exploding prices (see also De Long et al. [1990b]) while fundamentalists are associated with a stabilizing
influence on assets. Out of this, the following question arises:
Are the balancing effects of fundamentalists strong enough to stabilize prices or are chartists’
destabilizing impacts able to surpass the fundamentalists’ compensatory behavior?
To address this research question, in recent years HAMs have been increasingly applied in respective
analyses [Gaunersdorfer and Hommes, 2005, Hommes, 2002, Lux, 1995, 1998, Lux and Marchesi, 1999,
2000].2 The models typically use bounded rational agents, (imperfect) heuristics or rules of thumb, and
nonlinear dynamics (which might be chaotic). Some studies state that fundamentalists’ stabilizing effects
are not necessarily strong enough to stabilize markets as summarized in Hommes [2006a]. However,
1If they were alone on the market both fundamentalists’ and trend followers’ strategies are self-fulfilling prophecies and
would in general make money.
2The results of theses studies in principle provide useful explanations for many stylized facts, like excess volatility, high
trading volume, temporary bubbles, trend following, sudden crashes, mean reversion, clustered volatility and fat tailed
distribution returns. For an excellent overview regarding HAM see, among others, Hommes [2006a].
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the results are mostly obtained through simulations and are not analytically proven (see, e.g., Hommes
[2006a]).3 A second question arises:
Is it possible to analytically prove that chartists’ behavior can lead to exploding prices irre-
spective of fundamentalists’ compensatory effects?
The main contribution of our paper is a mathematically rigorous proof that chartists’ behaviour – in
particular the behavior of linear feedback traders without rational expectations and without information
about the market (fundamental value, trading volume, or even prices) – can surpass the stabilizing effects
of fundamentalists, i.e., traders with rational expectations of the fundamental value. Put differently, prices
can explode as the stabilizing effects of fundamentalists can be outweighed by linear feedback traders.
Unstable price developments are the result, which in turn increase the likelihood of the occurrence of
a financial bubble. As shown in the proof, thresholds for model inherent values can be specified for
which a bubble will occur with certainty. Furthermore, an assignment for external parameters exists
which means that the thresholds of the inherent values can be reached at all. The analysis shows that
even fundamentalists without any liquidity constraints and with perfect information about the price, the
fundamental value, and the market’s characteristics are not sufficient to stabilize a very simply constructed
market based on (excess) demand if the feedback trader’s initial investment is large enough.
In applied mathematics resp. control engineering there are many new results concerning technical
trading strategies [Barmish and Primbs, 2011, 2015]. Performance properties of chartist strategies are
proven and it is explained why it is reasonable to trade according to a feedback strategy. In contrast to
the feedback trading literature where the price taker property is usually presumed, we study the effects
of trading strategies in an HAM that displays phenomena caused by (excess) demand [Baumann, 2015a].
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the price model as well as the investment
strategies of feedback traders and fundamentalists. Section 3 answers the main question of the paper:
whether the presence of fundamentalists is sufficient to stabilize the market. Section 4 presents further
results based on calculations of Section 3 and Section 5 discusses limitations of the work at hand, gives
ideas for future work, and concludes the paper.
3Among the few exception is, e.g., De Long et al. [1990b], where the effect of positive feedback traders and informed
speculators, who evaluate and consider the needs of the other market participants, especially the growing needs of the
positive feedback traders, in a three period market model facing fundamantalists is investigated. De Long et al. [1990b]
show that the interaction of these two trader types pushes the price away from the fundamental value under specific
assumptions and despite the fundamentalists’ stabilizing behavior. The present work differs from De Long et al. [1990b] in
that we do not investigate how two types of traders, namely positive feedback traders and informed speculators, jointly push
up the price but rather only trend followers. Positive feedback traders have, compared to long-sighted informed speculators,
less information about the market and are short-sighted. We further do not assume a predetermined end of the market.
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2 Model structure
The model consists of a one asset market and is populated with two types of heterogeneous agents, namely
fundamentalists and chartists. How their interaction with the market maker takes place is illustrated in
Section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents the price process in the interactive market model. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and
2.5 introduce the traders and their expectations. For simplification of the analysis we assume that there
is only one feedback trader and one (or exceptionally none) fundamentalist. One can think of many,
coordinated traders that are summarized to one big trader, i.e., we treat, e.g., all existing feeadback
traders as one average feedback trader.4
2.1 Timeline
At the beginning of every period t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, each agent ` ∈ {FT, FU}, where FT is the feedback
trader (chartist) and FU the fundamentalist, decides on how to invest based on his investment strategy,
where T is unknown or even∞. Each investment strategy I`t is characterized by a different heuristic (rule
of thumb) in order to make a decision. According to the strategy, each agent then allocates his financial
resources among the asset market. In doing so, the trader knows the past market data. The resulting
changes in the investments, denoted by ∆I`t , are cleared by a market maker who adjusts asset prices
according to (excess) demand. After the traders have observed the price change ∆pt and hence their
own gains or losses ∆g`t in the recent period, they use this information to derive their next investment
decision.5 One can imagine, that at the end of each period the investment is capitalized and reinvested.
The timeline of the traders’ and the market maker’s decisions and interactions is shown in the diagram
of Figure 1.
2.2 Price Process for the Interactive Market Model
In feedback trading literature, price is usually determined through a certain price process, like geometric
Brownian motion (GBM), which is exogenously given [Barmish and Primbs, 2015]. This implies that the
traders are not able to influence the price. To avoid this price taker property, which is a strong restriction
of every market model, so-called agent based price models have evolved in academically economic litera-
ture (see, e.g., Hommes [2006a]). According to these models, the price is a function of traders’ investment
decisions. We denote the sum of all traders’ changes of investment at time t with ∆It =
∑
` ∆I
`
t . Based
4There is indeed no difference between one feedback trader with an initial investment IFT0 and fixed K, see equation
(3), and n feedback traders with initial investments
IFT0
n
and the same K. I.e., for the feedback traders this summarization
is without loss of generality (WLOG). Whether this assumption is WLOG for fundamentalists, too, has to be examined in
future work.
5For all processes αt we set ∆αt = αt−αt−1 as the change of the underlying process, e.g., ∆g`t is the period profit while
g`t is the overall gain/loss of trader `.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the traders’ and the market maker’s decisions and interactions with ∆g`t = I
`
t−1 · ∆ptpt−1
on the idea of interacting agents, in Baumann [2015a] a pricing model that fulfills the law of (excess)
demand, namely
(I1) pt+1 = pt, if ∆It = 0
(I2) pt+1 →∞, if ∆It →∞
(I3) pt+1 → 0, if ∆It → −∞
(I4) pt+1 strictly monotonous increasing in ∆It
is constructed. Thereby, for the purpose of simplification, we assume a infinite supply. That means, the
law of supply and demand reduces to a law of (excess) demand.6 This model, which is in a sense a natural
generalization of the GBM (proven in Baumann [2015a]), in its general form is given by
pt+1 = pt · eM−1∆It (1)
= p0 · eM−1It (2)
where M > 0 is a scaling factor expressing the trading volume of the underlying stock7. This pricing
model is closed through a market maker (see Drescher and Herz [2012]). As common practice, the market
maker acts as a privileged trader that sets prices according to (excess) demand (see Figure 2) and hence
ensures market clearing (cf. the role of a broker in stock markets) (see, e.g., Hommes [2006a]).8 In
Baumann and Baumann [2015] it is shown that this market model meets several stylized facts formulated
in Hommes [2006b].
6Alternatively, one can define (I1)-(I4) by use of the buying/selling decision Bt := It − ptpt−1 · It−1 instead of the change
of investment It − It−1. Then, a change of investment caused by price increase would not affect the price. The use of the
buying/selling decision instead of the change of investment would, according to simulations, affect the proposition of this
paper only quantitatively but not qualitatively. However, a finite supply would make the analysis much more complicated.
7If nothing else is given, for simplicity M is set to M = 1.
8A possible profit making and the survival of the market maker will not be discussed in the work at hand but is an
interesting topic for future work.
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Figure 2: Schematical representation of the role of the market maker with k traders
market
maker
linear
feedback
trader
gFTt = g
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1 · pt−pt−1pt−1
IFTt = I
FT
0 + K · gFTt
information
Figure 3: Schematical interaction between market maker and linear feedback trader
2.3 Feedback Traders
In Barmish [2011], Barmish and Primbs [2011, 2015], and Baumann [2015a] a special class of trading
strategies based on control techniques, namely feedback trading, is outlined. The traders using such a
trading strategy are called feedback traders and utilize neither fundamentals nor the absolute asset value
to determine their investment. They only take into account their own gains and losses for specifying
their investment decision. For that reason, their strategy depends on prices relative to their previous
investments, i.e., feedback traders are chartists because gains or losses, respectively, are a function of the
price but not of any fundamental value. From a control theoretic point of view, feedback traders treat the
price like a disturbance variable and their strategy needs to be robust against this disturbing influence.
For calculating the gain of a certain trader, the market maker takes into account the traders’ investment
and the asset price.9 Not only for feedback traders it is true that the investment affects the gain, but for
feedback traders it additionally holds that the gain determines the investment.10
One specific feedback strategy, for example discussed in Barmish and Primbs [2011, 2012] and Bau-
9The price is a function of all traders’ investment, see section 2.2, and especially Figure 2.
10In the listed literature, mostly continuous time models are applied whereas this analysis uses a discrete time model
because this is, as for example stated by Barmish and Primbs [2011], the weaker, more general assumption.
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mann [2015b], is the so-called (positive) linear feedback strategy
IFTt := I
FT
0 + K · gFTt (3)
performed by the linear feedback trader who calculates his investment IFTt at time t as a linear function of
his gain/loss function gFTt using the initial investment I
FT
0 > 0 and a feedback parameter K > 0. Figure
3 shows a feedback loop between the gain or loss gFT of a linear feedback trader and his investment IFT .
By calculating the gain or loss of a specific trader (or group of traders) ` through
g`t =
t∑
i=1
I`i−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(4)
where pt denotes the price process
11 and I`t the trader’s investment at time t, it follows that linear
feedback traders are trend followers given IFTt > 0 (see also (7)). A trader is called trend follower (cf.
Covel [2004]) if his investment increases when prices are rising and decreases when prices are falling. It
should be mentioned that the particular bought/sold investment amount at time t ≥ 1 is given through
∆IFTt = I
FT
t − IFTt−1 (5)
= K · (gFTt − gFTt−1) (6)
= K · IFTt−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(7)
whereas IFTt denotes the total investment at time t (all particular investment amounts up to time t) of a
feedback trader FT . Rising prices lead to an increasing gain of the linear feedback trader if IFTt > 0 and
thus his investment is increasing, too. Analogously, falling prices lower the gain and the trader disinvests.
In Baumann [2015a] it is shown that in case only one feedback trader is acting on the market with a price
process described by (1), it holds that
It > 0 ∀t, (8)
∆It > 0 ∀t, and (9)
if ∃t : ∆It > ∆It−1 (10)
⇒ ∆It+1 > ∆It. (11)
This is important as it will be shown that, together with the results of Section 3, the price explosion effects
of feedback traders, that would have occurred when acting without fundamentalists, can be compensated
11The relative price change
pt−pt−1
pt−1
is called return on investment (ROI).
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by fundamentalists — at least up to a certain degree.
Two typical investment paths can be identified in the scenario only one feedback-based trader is acting
on the market. The two paths are shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b where the stock price pt is indicated
with a solid line and the feedback trader’s investment with a dashed one. If IFT0 lies below a specific
threshold, IFTt converges (Figure 4a), if it is above this threshold the investment explodes (Figure 4b).
In Baumann [2015a], a non-closed formula is given for determining the threshold. Specific values can
only be derived through simulation like the one in Figure 4 and algorithmically localizing the threshold.
Control-based trading strategies like the one presented in Barmish and Primbs [2014] are interesting
for further analysis since there exist several notable results in literature, for example the guarantee of non-
negative profit for the so-called simultaneous-long-short (SLS) strategy that has initial investment zero
and consists of two linear feedback strategies for continuously differentiable prices (Arbitrage!). For prices
following a GBM, for price processes allowing for jumps (Merton’s Jump Diffusion Model (MJDM)), and
for all essentially linearly representable prices one can expect positive profit for the SLS strategy, i.e.,
E[gSLSt ] > 0 while ISLS0 = 0.12 However, all of these settings assume the price taker property, as the price
process is defined independently of the traders’ investments. In contrast, here we drop the assumption
of the price taker property but consider an interactive market model, as introduced in Baumann [2015a],
as we want to examine the price’s behavior under heterogeneous agents.
By transforming equation (7), the feedback trader’s investment rate, we see that linear feedback
traders follow a strategy that can be written as
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + K · IFTt−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(12)
= IFTt−1 + K · IFTt−1 · (eM
−1∆It−1 − 1) (13)
which leads to an investment of
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + K · IFTt−1 · (eM
−1∆IFTt−1 − 1), (14)
in case only one trader, the linear feedback trader, is acting on the market.
To sum up, the idea behind linear feedback traders’ trading strategy is that money can be made by
12In Barmish and Primbs [2011] it is shown that a so-called SLS strategy which is the sum of two particular and opposed
linear feedback strategies with initial investment zero always makes a positive profit under the assumption of continuously
differentiable prices. Furthermore, if in a continuous time model prices follow a GBM the SLS strategy is expected to yield
non-negative profit (as proven in Barmish and Primbs [2011]). In Baumann [2015b] it is shown that even for a discontinuous
price process characterized through MJDM the result of positive expectation for SLS trading is still valid, independent of
intensity, type, and height of jumps. All, continuously differentiable prices, GBM, and MJDM fulfill the so-called price
taker property which is usually assumed in literature about feedback trading (see, e.g., Barmish [2011], Barmish and Primbs
[2011]). Furthermore, Baumann and Gru¨ne [2015] show that ISLS0 = 0 and E[gSLSt ] > 0 under the price taker assumption
even hold for all essentially linearly representable prices. This is a whole class of price models containing GBM and MJDM.
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(a) IFT0 below a specific threshold: I
FT
t (dashed
line) converges. {p0 = 1,M = 1, T = 50, FT (IFT0 =
0.3,K = 1)}.
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(b) IFT0 above a specific threshold: I
FT
t (dashed
line) diverges. {p0 = 1,M = 1, T = 13, FT (IFT0 =
0.4,K = 1)}.
Figure 4: Investment of feedback traders is indicated with a dashed line, development of the stock price
pt is indicated with a solid line; note the different scaling of the vertical axes
following the price trend.
2.4 Fundamentalists
As explained in Section 1, fundamentalists buy assets when the price is below the fundamental value ft > 0
and sell assets if the price is above the fundamental value. Against this background, it is of particular
interest how much fundamentalists do invest or disinvest in the respective cases. For deterministic
fundamental values ft, i.e., the fundamental value is a function in t, one possibility to determine the
investment rates is
∆IFUt = M · ln
ft+1
pt
. (15)
In this case fundamentalists do not need to estimate the fundamental value but it is fix and known for sure.
Traders following investment rule (15) could be called strong fundamentalists because their investment
strategy could push the price back to its fundamental value at any time. If the strong fundamentalist is
the only trader buying/selling at time t, then for any pt > 0 and ft+1 it follows:
pt+1 = pt · eln
ft+1
pt (16)
= pt · ft+1
pt
(17)
= ft+1 (18)
In Section 2.5, a fundamentalist trading on a distorted fundamental value is presented. But as it will turn
out, this distortion does not affect the general behavior of the market model. To sum up the characteristics
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of fundamentalists, it can be said that if their view is correct, they can make money because the price
will converge to the fundamental value (see Section 1).
2.5 Expectations and Noise
As for some types of traders, e.g., informed speculators [De Long et al., 1990b], it is important that they
are subject to rational expectations we want to discuss whether feedback traders and fundamentalists
have expectations and, if this is the case, whether these are rational.
Feedback traders and trend followers in general are not subject to rational expectation formation, as
they only assume the existence of a trend. For example, with the knowledge of the current slope of the
asset price development (pt − pt−1) they forecast the further direction of the trend. By contrast, fun-
damentalists are assumed to have rational expectations (see, e.g., Drescher and Herz [2012]). Generally,
they pursue the strategy
∆IFUt = M · ln
E[ft+1|ft]
pt
. (19)
As it can be observed in real markets, price fluctuations are seldom purely rational. There is always
noise and uncertainty in the market, a factor considered essential by many economists (see, e.g., Black
[1986], De Long et al. [1990a]). Some reasons for noise are, for instance, that traders are making mistakes,
trade on noisy information, which is taken for real, or simply enjoy trading and do not follow a somehow
rational strategy.
For the further analysis in the work at hand, we do not assume that traders are making mistakes,
as this would lead to a completely unexpected, unsystematically behavior. Furthermore, both feedback
traders and fundamentalists follow a specified strategy. The only way of how noise could enter the market
is through noisy information. However, the traders’ investments as well as the price, announced by the
market maker (see Figure 1), are not distorted. The only information that could be noisy is that one
about the fundamental value. In this case, the fundamentalist has to estimate ft+1 at time t and trade
according to (19). Since it is unreasonable that |ft+1 − E[ft+1]| becomes arbitrary large but exploding
prices imply |pt − ft| → ∞, the effects of noisy information do not play a decisive role.
That is why we a priori consider ft being a deterministic fundamental value in the presented work.
3 Proof of Limitations of Fundamentalists’ Stabilizing Effects
Now we show analytically and mathematically rigorously shown that fundamentalists are not always able
to stabilize markets through their trading actions. As simulations indicate that this seems to be true,
it is inductively proven that effects of linear feedback traders dominate those of fundamentalists and
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destabilize markets.
After having defined the pricing model (1) and the traders, the next task is to check whether funda-
mentalists defined according to formula (15) are able to stabilize the price when trading simultaneously
on the market with linear feedback traders following (3) and (4). To simplify the notation, we set ft ≡ 1.
This is one special case, but if we can show the destabilizing effects of feedback traders’ investment
strategy for this case, the claim that fundamentalists do not always have market stabilizing effects, holds
in general. The proof shall proceed without using technical trading restrictions as, for example, limiting
the feedback traders’ amount of investment.
These two trader types are suitable for analyzing the problem because when it turns out that prices
explode for appropriately chosen parameters IFT0 and K of linear feedback traders even when acting on
a market together with fundamentalists, with an investment strategy that could bring prices close to the
fundamental value in every point of time, then this shows that there exist chartists’ rules, in this case the
linear feedback strategy as a special trend follower rule, that are able to outperform the effects of strong
fundamentalists. Why it is enough to consider only linear feedback traders and fundamentalists and
no other types of traders, some of them presented in Baumann and Baumann [2015], becomes obvious
with the following consideration: If the feedback traders’ investment goes to infinity which means prices
explode, then also the absolute value of fundamentalists’ investment goes to infinity. Thus, the relatively
small investment13 of other possible traders, compared to the exploding investments of feedback traders
and fundamentalists, may be neglected at least for our analysis.14
Simulations show that there exist two typical price developments, see Figures 5a and 5b. In Figure 5a,
fundamentalists’ effects predominate and the price stabilizes around the fundamental value. In Section
4, this converging investment effect is shown in case K = 1, where K is the feedback parameter from
(3), and a specific limit value for IFT0 is computed. In Figure 5b, the market development is, however,
not that obvious. At a first glance, the figure might suggest that prices explode. But as the simulation
software reaches its limits, it is not sure whether or not prices level out in these simulation scenarios. We
are therefore in need of an analytical examination. In cases like those shown in the simulated Figure 5b,
the proposition of Theorem 1 provides guarantee whether the supposed exploding investment of feedback
traders is in fact exploding, or whether this impression only emerges due to simulational insufficiencies
and the investment is eventually stabilized but with a greater amplitude as, for example, in Figure 5a.
In order to simplify the expressions in the model, we assume that ft ≡ 1, as already mentioned above,
13Trend followers invest a lot if prices rise strongly and fundamentalist disinvest a lot if price exceeds the fundamental
value greatly, i.e., investment of trend followers goes against infinity and that one of fundamentalists goes against minus
infinity. For traders which neither predicate their investment on the distance of fundamental value and price nor on the
slope of the price it is quite unreasonable that their investment goes against (minus) infinity.
14For moving average traders (MA) and noise traders (NO), both presented in Baumann and Baumann [2015] and needed
for a valid market model as also shown in Baumann and Baumann [2015], usually |∆IMAt | ≤ ∆I∗ and P (|∆NOt | > B)→ 0
holds for B → ∞. Thus, only |∆IFTt | and |∆IFUt | can become arbitrarily large which is the only interesting contribution
for bubble analysis.
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(a) Price and feedback trader’s investment converg-
ing, i.e., fundamentalists’ effects predominate; pa-
rameters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T = 50, FU(ft ≡
1), F (IFT0 = 10,K = 0.5)}
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(b) Price and feedback trader’s investment diverg-
ing, i.e., feedback traders’ effects predominate; pa-
rameters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T = 3, FU(ft ≡
1), F (IFT0 = 15,K = 0.5)}
Figure 5: Two typical situations in a market involving feedback traders and fundamentalists (notice: T
differs in the two figures for better recognizability)
and also p0 = 1 for all upcoming equations. This choice is just one possible scaling but does not change
the model’s dynamics in general. It holds:15
∆IFUt = M · ln
ft+1
pt
(20)
= −M · ln eM−1It−1 (21)
= −It−1 (22)
= −IFTt−1 − IFUt−1 (23)
⇒ IFUt = −IFTt−1 (24)
⇒ ∆IFUt = −∆IFTt−1 (25)
With this, we can specify equation (13) that describes the investment of the feedback traders:
∆IFTt = K · IFTt−1(eM
−1(∆IFTt−1+∆I
FU
t−1) − 1) (26)
= K · IFTt−1(eM
−1(∆IFTt−1−∆IFTt−2) − 1) (27)
= K · IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (28)
Theorem 1 tells us conditions for the feedback trader’s investment IFT and its derivatives for which prices
15We define a process αt as (αt)t∈Z ⊂ R with αt = 0 ∀t < 0. Furthermore, we define the ∆-operator as ∆kαt :=
∆k−1αt −∆k−1αt−1, ∆1αt := ∆αt = αt − αt−1, and ∆0αt := αt. A price process pt is strictly positive, i.e., (pt)t > 0 for
all t ≥ 0.
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explode. It should be noted that the following implication holds:
∆kIFTt−1 > a ∧ ∆k+1IFTt > b ⇒ ∆kIFTt > a + b. (29)
We obtain this directly from the definition of the delta operator which is equivalent to
∆kIFTt = ∆
k+1IFTt + ∆
kIFTt−1. (30)
Theorem 1. For the investment of the positive linear feedback trader (3) interacting with a strong
fundamentalist (15) on the market model (1), under conditions
∆3IFTt > M · ln 2, (31)
∆2IFTt > M · ln 2 ·max
{
1,K−1
}
, (32)
∆IFTt−1 > 0, and (33)
IFTt−2 > 0 (34)
it follows that
∆kIFTt+1 > M · ln 2 ∀k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (35)
and
∆2IFTt+1 > M · ln 2 ·K−1. (36)
This means, the feedback trader’s investment, the slope of investment, the curvature of investment,
and the increase of the curvature of the investment are strictly greater than M · ln 2 for all t ≥ t∗ for
some t∗. All in all, this is a fast exploding investment, which leads to an equally fast exploding price, as
equation (24) states that fundamentalists always respond one period later with the inversed investment
of feedback traders. In other words, the feedback trader’s investment increases, the rate of increase in-
creases, and the rate of this growth increases. Furthermore, all of this growth rates are bounded from
below. Since the investment of the fundamentalist is minus the investment of the feedback trader from one
period before the ratio of the (dis-)invested amounts is strictly getting larger, i.e., the feedback trader’s
exploding effect predominates the fundamentalist’s stabilizing one. Theorem 1 is proven by induction in
the following.
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Proof. It is enough to show (35) for k = 3 as all other inequalities can then be derived from (29) resp.
(30).
1
K
∆3IFTt+1 =
1
K
(∆2IFTt+1 −∆2IFTt ) (37)
=
1
K
(∆IFTt+1 − 2∆IFTt + ∆IFTt−1) (38)
= IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (39)
− 2IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (40)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (41)
= (IFTt−2 + ∆I
FT
t−1 + ∆I
FT
t )(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (42)
− 2(IFTt−2 + ∆IFTt−1)(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (43)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (44)
= IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (45)
+ ∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (46)
+ ∆IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (47)
− 2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (48)
− 2∆IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (49)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (50)
= IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 2eM−1∆2IFTt−1 + eM−1∆2IFTt−2) (51)
+ 2∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt − eM−1∆2IFTt−1) (52)
+ ∆IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (53)
We evaluate these summands separately:
(52) = 2∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt−1+M
−1∆3IFTt − eM−1∆2IFTt−1) (54)
= 2∆IFTt−1e
M−1∆2IFTt−1(eM
−1∆3IFTt − 1) (55)
> 2∆IFTt−1e
M−1∆2IFTt−1(2− 1) (56)
> 0 (57)
(53) = (∆IFTt−1 + ∆
2IFTt )(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (58)
> 0 + M ·max{ln 2, ln 2
K
} (59)
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> M · ln 2
K
(60)
(51) = IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2+M
−1∆3IFTt−1+M
−1∆3IFTt (61)
− 2eM−1∆2IFTt−2+M−1∆3IFTt−1 + eM−1∆2IFTt−2) (62)
= IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆3IFTt−1(eM
−1∆3IFTt − 2) + 1) (63)
> IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆3IFTt−1(2− 2) + 1) (64)
= IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 (65)
> 0 (66)
As a result, we get
∆3IFTt+1 > M · ln 2. (67)
That the conditions for the endogenous variables IFTt−2,∆I
FT
t−1,∆
2IFTt ,∆
3IFTt may be fulfilled for
some t (and some parameter assignment) is shown in Table 1 in which the investment development of the
feedback trader and its derivatives are listed for IFT0 = 15, K = 0.5, and M = 10. That means exogenous
variables exist so that prices may explode. This demonstrates that feedback traders’ effects are able to
outperform fundamentalists’ effects.
On the other hand, Table 2 shows a situation where price would explode if only feedback traders
would act on the market. Equations (8)–(10) hold for the feedback traders, so, according to Baumann
[2015a], their investment causes a bubble when acting without any other traders. If fundamentalists enter
the market, too, price explosion is, however, prevented, as the investment rates tend to 0 at time t = 80
in Table 2. Clearly, the conditions of Theorem 1 for feedback traders are not satisfied.
To conclude this section, we summarize that even a strong fundamentalist’s investment rule, i.e., a
fundamentalist’s strategy without any restrictions including a possibly infinitely large investment amount,
IFTt ∆I
FT
t ∆
2IFTt ∆
3IFTt
t = 0 15 15 15 15
t = 1 41.112668 26.112668 11.112668 -3.88733197
t = 2 83.0106859 41.8980179 15.7853499 4.67268186
t = 3 242.716956 159.70627 117.808252 102.022902
t = 4 15864296.3 15864053.3 15863893.8 15863776
Table 1: The boxed table entries fulfill the conditions of Theorem 1 for t = 3 for which prices explode;
market parameters are as in Figure 5b
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always following investment rule (15) where a large price may lead to an even larger negative investment
rate, is not able to stabilize the market when a trader with a really simply constructed linear feedback
strategy with an adequate initial investment is acting on the market, too. Market failures can happen,
prices may explode, and the investment rule of a strong fundamentalist cannot prevent this.
4 Further Results for K = 1
After having shown that the pricing model as described in (1) together with a quite simple chartist rule
is able to cause financial bubbles even when acting on the market together with strong fundamentalists,
some further results and special features of the market model shall be given when the linear feedback
trader is a reasonable all-in feedback trader, i.e., a linear feedback trader that invests all of his gain
but nothing more, i.e., K = 1. For two specific cases, formula simplifications for the feedback trader’s
investment are given. The first case is a market with only a linear feedback trader, the second case is a
market with a linear feedback trader and a fundamentalist. Furthermore, as already mentioned in Section
3, if existing, i.e., when no bubble occurs, the limit values of the investment is calculated for these cases.
For simplicity we set M = 1.
4.1 Case 1: All-in Linear Feedback Trader
In the first case with only one linear feedback trader, equation (14) simplifies to:
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1 · (e∆I
FT
t−1 − 1) (68)
= IFTt−1 · e∆I
FT
t−1 (69)
= IFT0 · e∆I
FT
0 · · · e∆IFTt−1 (70)
= IFT0 · eI
FT
t−1 (71)
IFTt ∆I
FT
t ∆
2IFTt ∆
3IFTt
t = 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
t = 1 0.59672988 0.19672988 -0.2032701 -0.6032701
· · ·
t = 5 0.39734101 0.02131807 0.05226206 -0.069616
· · ·
t = 80 ≈0.4 ≈0 ≈0 ≈0
Table 2: The table shows a situation where price would explode without fundamentalists but is stabilized
by them. The investment parameters are the same as for Figure 4b where prices explode. The boxed
cells fulfill (8)-(10).
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In the case that IFTt converges to some value it follows
lim
t→∞ I
FT
t = −lw(−IFT0 ), (72)
where lw denotes the Lambert-W-function.16
4.2 Case 2: All-in Linear Feedback Trader and Fundamentalist
In the second case, we need to reshape equations (13) and (28) where the fundamentalist’s investment
rate is considered, too, to get the simplified feedback trader’s investment rate:
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1(e
∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (73)
= IFT0 · e∆
2IFT0 · · · e∆2IFTt−1 (74)
= IFT0 · e∆I
FT
t−1 (75)
In the case only linear feedback traders and fundamentalists acting on the market – which is also the
setting of the main result in Section 3 with K = 1 – it is easy to calculate the limit of the feedback trader’s
investment under the assumption that a limit exists (see, e.g., Figure 6): If IFTt → c ∈ R ⇒ ∆IFTt → 0
and thus by using (75):
lim
t→∞ I
FT
t = I
FT
0 (76)
This fact is illustrated in Figure 6a. Furthermore, it should be noticed that due to (28) (market with
feedback trader and fundamentalist) for K ∈ (0, 1] we have IFTt ≥ 0, i.e., the linear feedback trader is a
long trader. In contrast, for K > 1, negative investments IFTt may occur, too, as shown in Figure 6b.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that the behavior of trend followers may lead to exploding price processes irrespec-
tive of fundamentalists’ investment decisions. In particular, Theorem 1 and its proof analytically show
that a fundamentalist’s investment strategy, i.e., a strategy that pushes prices towards its fundamental
value, can be insufficient to dominate linear feedback trading strategies. However, the boundaries for
feedback traders’ investments to cause a bubble appear to be higher (equations (31)–(34)) when funda-
mentalists are involved (cf. equations (8)–(10)). Although the results indicate that fundamentalists have
a stabilizing effect, this effect is limited up to some threshold values (cf. Table 2).
Moreover, the analysis also shows that for identical investment decisions price movements are more
16The Lambert-W-function is the inverse function of f(x) = x · ex.
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(a) Feedback trader’s investment converging to the
initial investment IFT0 ; parameters {p0 = 1,M =
10, T = 50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 = 8,K = 1)}
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(b) Negative investment of feedback trader; parame-
ters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T = 50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 =
1,K = 10)}
Figure 6: Two particular situations in a market model involving feedback traders and fundamentalists
volatile at higher price levels compared to lower price levels. This finding highlights that even this simply
constructed market model is able to capture certain market phenomena appropriately.
Given our results and the fact that financial bubbles are associated with high economic costs an
important question arises: as fundamentalists do not appear to be an adequate market stabilizing force,
one could ask if another type of trader, perhaps the market maker, is able to stabilize prices in a market
conform way and, if so, how such a trader could be constructed.
Generally, our analysis supports the view that intervention measures or at least some kind of incentive
systems is necessary in order to stabilize asset markets, and thus to prevent the emergence of financial
bubbles.
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